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I. IntroductIon
Since the establishment of the internet, the 
development of hardware and software had increased. 
The increasing quality of internet services today creates 
innovations. One of the innovation is the Internet of 
Things (IoT) [1]–[3]. The IoT makes physical devices 
in the environment (such as medical devices, vehicles, 
sensors) become part of computer networks and operate 
without human intervention [4], [5]. The architecture of 
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Abstrak—Artikel ini mengusulkan mekanisme otentikasi pada protokol MQ Telemetry Transport (MQTT). 
Pertukaran data dalam sistem IoT menjadi aktivitas penting. Pertukaran data ini dilakukan dengan komunikasi 
antar perangkat Internet of Things (IoT). Protokol MQTT adalah protokol komunikasi yang cepat dan ringan untuk 
IoT. Protokol MQTT menggunakan broker sebagai peladen untuk publish/subscribe. Salah satu masalah pada 
protokol MQTT adalah tidak adanya mekanisme keamanan pada pengaturan awal. Tahap registrasi client memiliki 
kerentanan terhadap serangan client palsu karena tidak adanya mekanisme otentikasi. Mekanisme otentikasi telah 
dibuat sebelumnya menggunakan Transport Layer Security (TLS). Namun, mekanisme TLS mengkonsumsi lebih 
dari 100 KB memori data dan tidak bersahabat untuk perangkat yang memiliki batasan. Oleh karena permasalahan 
tersebut diperlukan mekanisme otentikasi yang cocok untuk perangkat terbatas. Artikel ini mengusulkan protokol 
untuk mekanisme otentikasi berbasis kejadian dan dinamis untuk protokol MQTT. Penggunaan berbasis 
kejadian diajukan untuk mengurangi beban komputasi perangkat terbatas. Penggunaan dinamis ditujukan untuk 
memberikan properti otentikasi yang berbeda pada setiap sesi sehingga dapat meningkatkan keamanan otentikasi. 
Dari hasil evaluasi, protokol otentikasi dinamis berbasis kejadian berhasil diterapkan kepada perangkat terbatas 
mikrokontroler dan broker. Mikrokontroler sebagai client mampu melakukan proses untuk protokol yang diajukan. 
Broker mampu memilah client yang otentik dan perangkat terbatas mampu melakukan komputasi untuk melakukan 
proses mutual otentikasi kepada client. Mikrokontroler menggunakan 52% memori untuk protokol yang diajukan 
dan hanya mengkonsumsi 2% lebih tinggi dari protokol tanpa keamanan. Broker mampu memilah client yang 
otentik dan perangkat terbatas mampu melakukan komputasi untuk melakukan proses mutual otentikasi kepada 
client. Broker menggunakan real memori maksimum sebesar 4,3 MB dan penggunaan CPU maksimum 3,7%..
Kata kunci: IoT, otentikasi, dinamis, berbasis kejadiaan, MQTT
Abstract—This paper proposes an authentication mechanism on the MQ Telemetry Transport (MQTT) protocol. 
The exchange of data in the IoT system became an important activity. The MQTT protocol is a fast and lightweight 
communication protocol for IoT. One of the problems with the MQTT protocol is that there is no security 
mechanism in the initial setup. One security attack may occur during the client registration phase. The client 
registration phase has a vulnerability to accept false clients due to the absence of an authentication mechanism. 
An authentication mechanism has been previously made using Transport Layer Security (TLS). However, the 
TLS mechanism consumes more than 100 KB of data memory and is not suitable for devices that have limitations. 
Therefore, a suitable authentication mechanism for constraint devices is required. This paper proposes a protocol 
for authentication mechanisms using dynamic and event-based authentication for the MQTT protocol. The event-
based is used to reduce the computing burden of constraint devices. Dynamic usage is intended to provide different 
authentication properties for each session so that it can improve authentication security. As results, the applied of 
the event-based dynamic authentication protocol was successful in the constraint devices of microcontrollers and 
broker. The microcontroller, as a client, is able to process the proposed protocol. The client uses 52% of the memory 
for the proposed protocol and only consumes 2% higher than the protocol without security. The broker can find 
authentic clients and constraint devices capable of computing to carry out mutual authentication processes to clients. 
The broker uses a maximum of 4.3 MB of real memory and a maximum CPU usage of 3.7%.
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the IoT consists of four-layer: Sensing layer, Network 
layer, Service layer, and Applications layer [6]. The 
Sensing layer generally contains constraint devices as in 
RFC72278 [7]. The constraint device is used to convert 
environmental parameters into digital data. The use of 
constraint devices to the IoT is intended to be one of them 
for device mobilization and resource requirements.
The data from the sensing layer was sent to another 
layer using the communication protocol. The network 
layer provides a communication protocol between 
nodes. One of the communication protocol for the IoT 
is Message Queuing Telemetry Transport (MQTT). The 
MQTT protocol is an open standard protocol that is issued 
by the Organization for the Advancement of Structured 
Information Standards (OASIS) that can be used with 
devices that have limited memory, low data rates and 
are transmitted over the network [8]–[10]. The MQTT 
protocol works with the published/subscribed model. 
Figure 1 shows a scheme of communication between 
the client and the broker. That figure shows the MQTT 
protocol scheme which consists of publisher P1, P2, ..., Pn 
and subscriber S1, S2, ..., Sn. The task of the publisher is 
to send data to the MQTT broker through networks, and 
the subscriber is to receive messages from brokers through 
networks on certain topics. The clients use the topic to 
publish and subscribe.
However, from the advantages possessed by the 
MQTT protocol, the MQTT protocol has a threat [8], 
[9], especially at MQTT brokers. The activities such as 
registering and publishing are using the MQTT broker. The 
MQTT protocol does not have a security mechanism in 
the default setting [11], [8], [9]. Since the absences of the 
security mechanism in the MQTT protocol causes several 
problems, one of them is the authentication mechanism [6], 
[8], [9], [11]. The authentication mechanism is a method to 
prove the authenticity of the client, whether it is legitimate 
or not to the broker. Because the broker cannot verify the 
client, the broker can accept the connection message from 
any client. This phase has a vulnerability to the broker 
receiving a fake client. Unauthenticated clients can cause 
unauthorized access [6] that results in fake messages, 
malfunctions, or collapses.
Authentication issues in the MQTT protocol have been 
previously addressed. One mechanism is to use Transport 
Layer Security (TLS). The TLS is a security standard 
for communication between two parties. The TLS is 
providing symmetric, asymmetric, and hash encryption to 
accommodate integrity, confidentiality, and authentication. 
However, Sorcha Nolan [12] states that TLS added costs 
to the process, so it was not suitable for constraint devices. 
Gil Reiter [13] states that TLS used more than 100 KB of 
memory consumption, which is certainly not a problem 
for smartphone, but it is a problem for constraint devices 
to RFC7228. Miranda P. et al. [14] states that there was 
overhead energy for TLS. To deal with the problem of 
energy use in the TLS, Tae Ho Cho et al. [15] proposed 
the method. However, Tae Ho Cho et al. proposed method 
cannot handle the problem of memory usage [12].
The overconnected handling needed to overcome the 
authentication problems. Overconnected is caused by an 
end device that cannot prove the authenticity of the client. 
This research proposes an event-based authentication 
protocol mechanism. The authentication mechanism 
proposed in this research consists of two pillars, namely 
event-based and dynamic property pillars. The use of 
event-based control systems pillar performed when 
triggers occur, which potentially reduce computational 
and communication burdens and do not require additional 
synchronization to the server [16]. The dynamic pillar 
makes security attributes on each event change so that 
it can improve security. In this research succeeded in 
implementing event-based dynamic authentication 
on microcontroller devices, and brokers were able to 
authenticate clients.
The contribution of this research is to improve security 
in the MQTT protocol by using dynamic event-based 
authentication. In this research, it introduced a dynamic 
authentication security mechanism using an event-based 
control system that had not previously been studied on 
the IoT. This study proposes a security mechanism that 
simultaneously considers computing and memory on 
constraint devices such as microcontrollers. Previous 
research has tried to solve this problem, but as far as 
we know, it does not consider computing devices that 
have limitations either. Besides, previous research has 
not discussed authentication at the client level on the 
IoT system. Therefore, this study took part to improve 
authentication security.
II. LIterature revIew
The MQTT protocol is a communication protocol 
that uses the publish/subscribe mechanism to requests/
responses [17] [18] [11]. There are four properties at 
the MQTT protocol: IP, Payload, Topic, and Port [8]. 
The MQTT protocol, there are three agents: Publisher, 
Subscriber, and Broker. The Publisher works by connecting 
the client to the broker and sending messages to the 
broker. The subscriber works by connecting the client to 
the broker and receives messages on the desired topic. 
The broker work to exchange messages, receive messages 
and forward messages. The agents have relationships and 
are attached to certain attributes. The MQTT protocol, the 
topic is an inherent property that must exist.
Budi R. et al. [8] reviewed the security in the MQTT 
protocol. The Security required in MQTT includes Figure 1. Existing MQTT Scheme [8], [6]
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authentication, authorization, and access control. However, 
the MQTT protocol does not have it all. The MQTT 
protocol only provides authentication without encryption. 
The authentication process on the MQTT generally uses a 
username and password. The sending of the authentication 
message is not encrypted. Budi R. et al. [8] provides a 
demonstration of how the MQTT attacks are carried out 
on the network by obtaining an MQTT packet from the 
network. The attacker registers himself to the broker with 
the content from the obtained header data. Furthermore, 
the attacker gain access to the resources at the broker. S. N. 
Firdous et al. [9] provides categories of attacks and effects 
of attacks. The attack categories describes the denial 
of service, identity spoofing, information disclosure, 
elevation of privileges, and tampering data also explains 
how broker are attacked with unauthorized access.
The Transport Layer Security (TLS) security mechanism 
has been established to provide security mechanisms. TLS 
provides a secure communication channel through two 
hosts. TLS uses symmetric and asymmetric functions and 
hashes to provide authentication, encryption for data, and 
data integrity. TLS provides security for authentication, 
authorization, and encryption of data sent. TLS has 
become standard security for communication over the 
network. TLS in the MQTT protocol has been used to 
secure data and maintain the authenticity of the broker 
from the message received. However, P. Miranda et al. 
provides exposure to how TLS has overhead in computing 
[14]. The energy consumed depends on the amount of data 
to be sent. Gil Reiter explained that TLS needed at least 
100 KB of memory [13]. The computation of TLS security 
mechanism that can be done by smart-phones and other 
devices that have much memory, but not for devices that 
have limitations such as those on RFC7228 [7].
Sorcha Nolan had provided another security mechanism 
at MQTT [12]. Sorcha Nolan provides an authentication 
mechanism on the MQTT protocol by providing encryption 
on the payload. This study aims to provide low computing 
and memory usage for the authentication process on the 
MQTT protocol payload. Sorcha Nolan succeeded in 
providing an authentication mechanism on MQTT content 
regarding clients that have limitations. However, this study 
does not pay attention to client authentication mechanism, 
where it is used to validate the clients that want to uses the 
broker resources.
The control system, there are two types, event-based 
and time-based. An event-based control system is a control 
system that updates its information when a particular event 
triggers the function. This control system computation 
carried out if certain events trigger the system. This control 
scheme is a solution where the device has a limit power 
usage [16]. An event-based control system performed 
when state changes occur, or there are triggers from other 
operations that potentially reduce the computing burden. 
In the case of IoT, because not all the IoT devices have 
the same delivery time, event-based control system more 
efficient. Also, the eventbased control scheme saves 
bandwidth because it does not require synchronization to 
the server to update the property.
III. MethodoLogy and SySteM deSIgn
A. Proposed Protocol Concept
The design of the proposed protocol for dynamic 
event-based authentication divided into two: event id and 
encryption. Pseudo-random number generator is used to 
create the event id. The pseudo-random number generator 
has a concept where the seed becomes a generator of 
current value. Each client owns a seed (each one), and 
the broker owns the entire list of client seeds. The event 
id is formed by clients who want to register and brokers 
to mutually authenticate. Moreover, the event id formed 
by the client is called Evk and the broker is called Evb. 
The encryption process, the value of the event id is 
added with random characters, and then processed with 
symmetric encryption using the Fisher Yates Shuffle. The 
Fisher-Yates shuffle uses key R as an individual scrambler. 
The Fisher-Yates was chosen because it fulfills unbiased 
permutation rules. It only requires a portion of time for 
a number of individuals, and does not require additional 
space [19] [20]. Moreover, the results of encryption from 
the client are called Ec(Evk), and the broker is called 
Ec(Evb). The Ec(Evk) is used by the client to register to the 
broker, and Ec(Evb) is used by brokers to provide mutual 
authentication to the client. Because the event id built with 
a pseudo-random number generator that is affected by the 
seed, the seed must be updated to ensure the dynamic event 
id. The update of the event id on the client done after the 
client sends a message to the broker. On the broker’s side, 
the broker updates the related event id when the broker 
declares to accept the relevant client. Moreover, the entire 
system is described as in Figure 2.
B. Authentication Protocol Design
The proposed protocol, the client who register to the 
broker passes through the secure channel, is as shown in 
Figure 3. A security channel is formed to process client 
registering process to the broker. The client sends a 
registration message to the broker along with the Ec(Evk) 
security attribute through the CONNECT header. The 
MQTT broker receives CONNECT header from the 
clients and validates security properties Ec(Evk) from the 
clients. If the property Evk (from the Ec(Evk) decryption) 
from the client is accepted, then the broker gives a reply 
in the form of the security property Ec(Evb) to the client. 
The client receives a reply message Ec(Evb) from the 
broker and validates the broker security properties. If the 
client accepts Evb (from the Ec(Evb) decryption) from 
the broker, then the client believes that the sender is a 
legitimate broker. This scheme is used to validate the two-
way broker and client authentication.
In the registration process, the client must be able to 
prove its authenticity, and the broker must also be able 
to verify its authenticity. To complete the registration 
Rizka Reza Pahlevi dkk.: Implementation of Event-Based Dynamic Authentication on MQTT Protocol
128
process, the client must form the event id Evk. The 
random characters added to the event id that built before. 
The random character addition is needed to increase the 
security strength of the Fisher-Yates Shuffle. Adding 
random characters to the event id is done until it meets the 
length m. After the event id has been added with random 
characters to the length m, it is processed with the Fisher-
Yates shuffle so that it becomes Ec(Evk). The client sends 
this result from Ec(Evk) to the broker. The broker who has 
received Ec(Evk) decodes to get Evk. If Evk is accepted, 
then the broker forming Evb, then random characters are 
added to have the length m and processed with the Fisher-
Yates shuffle to form Ec(Evb), then the Ec(Evb) is sent to 
the corresponding client. The related client that receives 
Ec(Evb) decode to gets Evb. If Evb is accepted, then the 
client has received a message from a legitimate broker.
C. System Design
1. Client Authentication: The system design for the 
proposed protocol consists of two major parts, namely the 
formation of event id and encryption. The formation of 
event id based on the rules of the pseudo-random number 
generator [21]. All seeds used by the client for the pseudo-
random number function are registered with the broker. 
Then the client forms the event id. The event id that has 
been formed by the client is added by random characters to 
the length m then encrypted with the Fisher-Yates Shuffle. 
Then the system design is depicted in Figure 4. The event id 
formed by the client goes through functions. The functions 
have properties that are only known by legitimate broker 
and clients. The product of these functions is a number that 
is influenced by the initial seed and functions properties. 
After the event id is done, a random character is added 
until it has a length of m. Both parties have agreed with this 
length of m. This m length is needed to improve security 
when performing the Fisher-Yates shuffle. The Fisher-
Yates shuffle has the property that each has a probability 
1 / m to move. With that probability, optimizing m can 
increase the reliability of individual locations. The event 
id that has been added with this random character is 
processed Fisher-Yates shuffle with key R for the random 
factor. The key R consists of an array along m where each 
array has a value with a range of 1 <m-1. The product of 
event id and random characters that have been subject to 
Fisher-Yates are called Ec(Evk). The product Ec(Evk) is 
embedded in the CONNECT header along with the ID in 
the client registration process. The ID does not store any 
sensitive information.
2. Broker Authentication: After the broker receives a 
registration request from the client, the broker checks 
the provisions of the registration form. After the broker 
receives the CONNECT packet from the client, the broker 
checks whether there is a registration form in the header. 
If there is a registration form as specified, then the broker 
decodes the message. The broker decoding Ec(Evk) are 
pinned on the header using the key R. The product decoding 
Ec(Evk) produces event id and random characters. The 
broker sorts out event id and random characters and leaves 
only the event id Evk. This event id Evk is used by the 
broker to find out the authenticity of the client. If the 
relevant event id Evk is registered to the broker, then the 
broker processes the mutual authentication. The mutual 
authentication process carried out by the broker is useful 
to inform the client that the sender is a legitimate broker. 
After the broker receives an event id from a valid client, 
the broker updates the seed of the relevant event id. The 
broker was forming the event id Evb from the new seed. 
The event id that is added random characters to the length 
m and processed with Fisher-Yates shuffle with key R. The 
result of the process is called Ec(Evb). The Ec(Evb) result 
sent to the related client to the PUBLISH header from 
the MQTT protocol. The system   design  is  depicted  in 
Figure 4.
3. Mutual Authentication: After the client receives a 
publish from the broker, the client checks the provisions 
of the authentication form. After the client receives the 
PUBLISH packet from the broker, the client checks 
whether there is an authentication form in the header. If 
there is an authentication form as specified, then the client 
decodes the message. After the client receives Ec(Evb) 
from the broker, the client decodes Ec(Evb) with key R. 
The result of the Ec(Evb) decoding process leaves the 
event id Evb and random characters. Then, the client sort 
the event id and random characters. After the event id Evb 
is found, the client matches the event id that the client-
owned. If the event id Evb that is sent matches, then the 
client believes that the sender is a legitimate broker. If 
Figure 3. Proposed secure protocol for MQTT
Figure 2. Proposed design protocol for MQTT
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the client states that he has a legitimate broker, then the 
client updates the previous seed. The event id that uses to 
register later becomes dynamic by updating the previous 
seed. The system design is illustrated in Figure 4
D. CPU and Real Memory Usage
The use of CPU and real memory is done to measure 
how much cost must be paid by the MQTT broker in 
performing the proposed and the existing protocols and 
how much additional memory is given to the constraint 
devices. The CPU and real memory measurements on the 
MQTT broker are measured by monitoring the process 
identifier (PID). This activity records the real memory and 
CPU usage of the PID used by the proposed and the existing 
protocols. After obtained the CPU and real memory usage 
data at the MQTT broker, the data is presented in a graph. 
Data samples taken were for 600 seconds (ten minutes) 
in each session. Measurement of additional memory on 
the constraint devices is done by compiling the code on 
the proposed and the existing protocols. The compiler 
used to compile the code in the Arduino IDE. The result 
from the compilation is the bytes size of the code being 
embedded in the constraint device. The subtraction in 
code size between the proposed protocol and the existing 
protocol give results in the amount of additional memory 
needed in the proposed protocol for the constraint device. 
The measurement of CPU and real memory usage on 
the MQTT broker and the addition of memory on the 
constraint devices provide information on costs to be paid 
by the proposed protocol.
Iv. reSuLt and dIScuSSIon
A. Proposed Protocol Algorithm
An algorithm is needed as a builder to build the 
proposed protocol on client and broker. The algorithm 1 
and algorithm 2 described is used on clients and broker. In 
the client, the end result of this algorithm is Ec(Evk), and 
the broker is Ec(Evb). These algorithms are divided into 
two parts. The first part is an algorithm to build a pseudo-
random number generator called Pr. The formation of 
the Pr refers to the seed. The clients use existing seeds 
to forming the Pr and the broker forming the Pr from the 
client seeds that owned. The second part is the formation 
of Ec. The formation of the Ec on the client is called 
Ec(Evk) then the broker is called Ec(Evb).
Algorithm 1: The function used to form Pr from the 
previous seed
Figure 4. System design of the proposed protocol
Client Broker
Init Seedi Init Seedi
compute Pri compute Pri
compute Evki compute Evbi 
rc ← random characters
Evki ← concat(Evki,rc)
Ec(Evki) ←{Evki,R}
CONNECT(ID,Ec(Evki))
Evki ←{Ec(Evki),R}
validate Evki with Evbi
compute new Seedi+1 compute new Seedi+1 for related client
compute Pri+1 compute Pri+1
compute Evki+1 compute Evbi+1
rc ← random characters
Evbi+1 ← concat(Evbi+1,rc)
Ec(Evbi+1) ←{Evbi+1,R}
PUBLISH(Ec(Evbi+1))
CONACK
Evbi+1 ←{Ec(Evbi+1),R}
validate Evbi+1 with Evki+1
compute new Seedi+2 compute new Seedi+2 for related client
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function ProducePr (seed,q,qroot,n);
Input : seed, q, qroot, n 
Output: Pri
Yi : integer, Ti : integer, Pri : integer;
Yi ← power(seed,qroot) modulo q;
Ti ← power(Yi,(qroot × n)) modulo q; 
Pri ← Ti ×(qroot ×(q − n)) modulo (Yi × q) ;
return Pri;
The algorithm 1 provides exposure to pseudo-code to 
form of the Pr. The value q is the prime number, and qroot 
is the prime root of q, and the n is the integer. The first 
row forms the Yi, then the Ti, and the last is the Pr. The last 
product in this algorithm is to return Pr. The product of the 
algorithm 1 it is combined with the algorithm 2 to forming 
Ec(Evk) (for the client) or Ec(Evk) (for the broker).
The algorithm 2 forms the last product in the registration 
process. The length of Pr is calculated, which used to 
specify the length of the random characters rc where is 
get from the length of m subtract the length of Pr. After 
the random character rc is formed, the random character 
rc to be combined with Pr. After merging is done, the 
function forming the value of key R as long m as the key 
to do Fisher-Yates. After getting the key R, the result of 
the merger between Pr and rc as Ev are subjected to the 
Fisher-Yates Shuffle by key R, which then produces Ec.
Algorithm 2: The procedure used to form Ec 
procedure
ProduceEvConnect ();
Input : seed, q, qroot, n, m
Output : Ec(Evk)
Pr : integer, lengthPr : integer, lengthrc : integer, rc : 
char, Ev : char , R : list of integer, Ec : char ; 
Pr ← ProducePr(seed,q,qroot,n); 
lengthPr ← lengthof(Pr);
lengthrc ← m − lengthPr; 
rc ← randomstring(rc,lengthrc);
Ev ← concat(Pr,rc);
R ← getkeyrandom();
Ec ← randomize(Ev,R);
B. Authentication Testing
Protocol testing is carried out in two stages, 
namely client authentication to the broker and mutual 
authentication broker to the client.
1. Client Authentication: on testing the client to the 
broker, the attention is the validity of the client to forming 
Ec(Evk). The test using m as long as 35. Figure 5 indicates 
that the client can form Ec(Evk). The first line of the figure 
shows the event id Evk that was formed. Then the second 
line indicates the random character is formed, and the 
third line shows the merger between Evk with random 
characters. The fifth line indicates the results of the third 
row is subjected to the Fisher-Yates Shuffle. The sixth line 
is the ID, and the seventh line is Ec(Evk) sent. Figure 5 
indicates that the event id is hidden by using Fisher-Yates 
shuffle. After the broker receives a registration message, 
the broker performs the validation. Figure 6 indicates that 
the broker can receive the registration message from the 
client. This acceptance can be seen in Figure 6 on the last 
line. On this line states that sending CONACK with the 
message (0,0). Message (0,0) in the MQTT manual states 
that 0x00 states the acceptance of the client [17]. From this 
process, it is stated that the broker can validate the event 
id sent by the client.
2. Broker Authentication: in the broker to the client 
testing, what the consideration is the client’s ability to 
authenticate the broker. The broker formed an event 
id Evb from a new seed from the related client to carry 
out a mutual authentication process. Furthermore, Evb 
from the broker added random character so that it has a 
length of 35 and is subject to the Fisher-Yates shuffle. 
Figure 7 shows the final result of Ec(Evb) from the broker 
that sent to the relevant client. Figure 7 in the last row 
indicates that there is Ec(Evb). After the corresponding 
client receives Ec(Evb), the client proves the event id that 
was received. Figure 8 shows that the client can receive 
mutual authentication messages from the broker. The first 
line indicates the reception of Ec(Evb). The second line 
indicates the decoding results of Ec(Evb). The third and 
Figure 6. Broker accept the client registe
Figure 8. The client receives mutual authentication
Figure 5. Microcontroller process the proposed protocol
Figure 7. MQTT packet mutual authentication from broker
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fourth line is the event id of the broker (Evb) and the event 
id of the client (Evk). Because Evb and Evk are the same, 
the client receives a broker. From this process stated that 
the client could validate the event id sent by the broker.
C. Proposed Protocol Security Test
In this test, there are two invalid clients. This invalid 
client tries to register to the broker by using a random 
event id. Figure 9 indicates that the broker receives a 
registration message from the client. The figure indicates 
that the broker receives a registration request from the 
client. Then the broker performs a decoding process on 
the registration message sent. The results of the decoding 
process, the broker did not find a match between the event 
id that sent with the event id that owned. Furthermore, 
the broker gives an “Auth Failed” signal, which states 
the authentication failed to the relevant client. After it 
is declared not accepted, the broker sends a CONACK 
message to the related client with message content (0,5). 
As in the manual MQTT manual, the message (0,5) states 
that the contents of 0x05 inform the client that it is not 
authenticated [17].
D. Client Memory Usage
In this test, it is intended to see the validity of the 
protocol built on the constraint device. This test uses 
ESP8266-12E as a client. This test uses the MQTT as 
the MQTT library for the ESP8266-12E and BigNumber 
 as the library to support the mathematical process. The 
MQTT library accommodates all headers and rules on the 
MQTT protocol. The BigNumber library is required to 
provide pseudo-random numbers and other mathematical 
calculation processes. Using the Arduino IDE 
, the compilation results that inform how much memory 
usage is done. From the results of the compilation carried 
out, the existing MQTT protocol uses 252.584 bytes 
or about 50% of the total memory of ESP8266-12E. 
Furthermore, the proposed protocol uses 262.404 bytes 
or about 52% of the full memory of ESP8266-12E. The 
difference in the amount of memory usage is 9.820 bytes 
or 2%. This memory usage is 2% greater than the MQTT 
protocol without security protocols. Thus, constraint 
devices still have more memory space to store other 
programs. In addition, with a difference of 2% the memory 
usage can reduce the amount of power used to generate 
memory. However, it should be noted that ESP8266-12E 
uses a 32-bit architecture with an instruction length of 16-
bit. Thus, the compilation of code entered into ESP8266-
12E is not only the size of the proposed protocol, but also 
includes the operating system, instructions, and address 
memory. Although ESP8266-12E has a flash of 512
Kb, ESP8266-12E actually only has a small space 
of around 32 Kb for code space (the rest is for operating 
system space, address, instructions). 
E. Broker Real Memory and Cpu Usage
The specification for the MQTT broker that used is Intel 
i5 7200U with 4 GB RAM and using the Ubuntu OS 16.04. 
Memory usage is allocated to 256 MB to measure the use 
of real memory in the proposed and existing protocols. 
Tolerated memory usage of the proposed protocol is 
less than 30% of the allocated memory. Analysis of real 
memory and CPU usage  on the MQTT broker have been 
done. This analysis is intended to identify the additional 
costs must be paid in  implementing the proposed protocol 
compared to existing MQTT protocols.
Non-Attack CPU and real memory usage: The scenario 
of testing real memory and CPU usage in the existing 
MQTT protocol is with three clients who continually 
connect at once every five seconds. Figure 10 shows a 
graph of the results of real memory and CPU usage in the 
existing MQTT protocol taken within ten minutes. Figure 
10 indicates that the maximum real memory usage is 
around 1.01 MB in the existing protocol. The maximum 
Figure 11. The broker real memory and CPU usage in the proposed 
MQTT protocol
Figure 9. The broker reject unauthenticated client
Figure 10. The broker memory and CPU usage in existing MQTT 
protocol
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CPU usage used in the existing MQTT protocol is around 
3.6%. Figure 10 also shows the CPU usage interval of 
the existing MQTT protocol. Furthermore, Figure 11 
indicates a graph of the results of the real memory and 
CPU usage on the proposed MQTT protocol taken within 
ten minutes. The scenario for testing the real memory 
and CPU usage on the proposed MQTT protocol is that 
three clients are continually making connections at once 
every five seconds. Figure 11 indicates that the real 
memory usage in the proposed protocol is dynamic, and 
the maximum is 4.3 MB. The maximum CPU usage for 
the proposed MQTT protocol is around 3.7%. Figure 11 
also indicates the CPU usage interval on the proposed 
MQTT protocol. From the results of Figure 10 and Figure 
11 shows differences in the real memory and CPU usage 
in the existing MQTT protocol and the proposed MQTT 
protocol. From the results of these tests indicates that the 
proposed MQTT protocol uses more real memory, which 
is 4.3 MB (1.67% from allocated memory) compared to 
the existing MQTT protocol use 1.01 MB (0.39% from 
allocated memory). The proposed protocol uses 3.29 
MB (1.28% of allocated memory) more than the existing 
protocol, which is still within the tolerance level (less than 
30% of allocated memory). The excessive real memory 
usage in the proposed protocol is because MQTT brokers 
need additional space in calculating to verify the incoming 
clients. On the other hand, maximum CPU usage on the 
proposed MQTT protocol was close at 3.7% compared to 
the existing MQTT protocol, which reached 3.6%. On the 
other hand, CPU usage intervals on the proposed MQTT 
protocol are more often compared to existing protocols. 
The increasing CPU usage is because the CPU has an 
additional burden to perform calculations to validate the 
incoming client.
Attack CPU and real memory usage: The testing is done 
to see the real memory and CPU usage in the proposed 
protocol when the attacker tries to enter. The scenario that 
used is made up of two groups. The first group is a three 
trusted client, and the second group is two attackers. A 
trusted client and attacker try to register with the proposed 
MQTT protocol. The attackers try to attack the MQTT 
broker by brute force at once every two seconds. According 
to the previous explanation that the trusted client rules are 
accepted and the attackers are rejected. Figure 12 shows 
the real memory and CPU usage when the MQTT broker 
is attacked, which is taken within ten minutes. Figure 
12 indicates that the real memory usage at the MQTT 
broker regularly increases. Maximum real memory usage 
is around 3.55 MB, and maximum CPU usage is 2.49%. 
However, when viewed from the CPU usage interval, it is 
lower than Figure 11. This interval difference is because 
the scenarios are different.
v. concLuSIon
This research has proposed an authentication mechanism 
in the MQTT protocol. Authentication problems that 
occur in the MQTT protocol can be overcome using the 
proposed protocol. The proposed protocol uses the event 
based dynamic mutual authentication to accommodate 
the authentication mechanism for the MQTT protocol. 
Dynamic concepts can change the different authentication 
attributes for each session. The event-based concept 
can be applied to the constraint devices to support the 
authentication process. Authentication is done in two-way 
between the client and the broker through a secure channel. 
The brokers and the clients can authenticate by validating 
the authentication attributes that are sent. The test 
indicates that the proposed protocol runs on the constraint 
device. The brokers and the constraint devices are able to 
carry out the entire process in the proposed protocol. The 
proposed protocol can reject registration messages from 
the invalid clients that use brute force attacks to the broker. 
The implementation of the proposed protocol uses 2% 
memory higher than the existing MQTT protocol without 
authentication on the constraint device. A sample of 
running MQTT brokers for 10 minutes found that MQTT 
brokers used a maximum of 4.3 MB of real memory with 
maximum CPU usage at 3.7% when accepting authentic 
clients. The MQTT broker uses a maximum of 3.55 MB of 
real memory with a maximum CPU usage of 2.49% when 
rejecting non-authentic clients.
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